Jespersen v harrahs. JESPERSEN V HARRAH'S, No. 03 2022-10-10
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JESPERSEN V HARRAH'S, No. 03
In fact, according to the "image consultant" who helped implement the policy, wearing makeup "completes" the "uniformed look" of women beverage servers. She has presented no evidence that she or any other employee has been sexually harassed as a result of the "Personal Best" policy. In deciding whether to grant summary judgment, a court must take three necessary steps: 1 it must determine whether a fact is material; 2 it must determine whether there exists a genuine issue for the trier of fact, as determined by the documents submitted to the court; and 3 it must consider that evidence in light of the appropriate standard of proof. City of Belleville, 119 F. Summary judgment has therefore been granted as to all of Plaintiff's claims except for the claim of disparate impact.
Jespersen v. Harrah’s: Firing of Woman Who Refused To Wear Make
It requires all of the bartenders to wear exactly the same uniforms while interacting with the public in the context of the entertainment industry. We cannot agree, however, that her objection to the makeup 4132 JESPERSEN v. Retrieved 14 November 2012. Moreover, as discussed, we do not find Defendant's policy discriminatory. While a man could jog to the casino, slip into his uniform, and get right to work, a woman must travel to work so as to avoid smearing her makeup, or arrive early to put on her makeup there. . I suspect many of my colleagues would feel the same way.
We hold that under the "unequal burdens" test, which is this Circuit's test for evaluating whether an employer's sex-differentiated appearance standards constitute sex discrimination in violation of Title VII, Jespersen failed to introduce evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether Harrah's "Personal Best" policy imposes unequal burdens on male and female employees. McKenna, Kenneth James McKenna, Inc. Male beverage servers continued to be prohibited from wearing makeup. Not only do we have her sworn statement to that effect, but there can be no doubt about her sincerity or the intensity of her feelings: She quit her job—a job she performed well for two decades—rather than put on the makeup. § 2000e-2 a 1. . The facts that Jespersen would have this court judicially notice are not subject to the requisite "high degree of indisputability" generally required for such judicial notice.
Darlene Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Company, Inc., 444 F.3d 1104
FLETCHER join, dissenting: I agree with the majority that appearance standards and grooming policies may be subject to Title VII claims. Her response to Harrah's motion for summary judgment relied solely on her own deposition testimony regarding her subjective reaction to the makeup policy, and on favorable customer feedback and employer evaluation forms regarding her work. § 2000e-2 e 1. Imagine, for example, a rule that all judges wear face powder, blush, mascara and lipstick while on the bench. Harrah's hair length requirement and ponytail prohibition for men should be compared to the requirement that women wear their hair "teased, curled, or styled" every day and that their hair be "worn down" at all times. Cont'l Southeastern Lines, Inc.
Opinion for JESPERSEN V HARRAH'S :: Justia Dockets & Filings
Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate where there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. The district court granted Harrah's motion for summary judgment on all of Jespersen's claims. No exotic nail art or length. Jespersen acknowledged receipt of the policy and committed to adhere to the appearance standards for her position as a beverage bartender in March 2000. Jespersen made no cross-motion for summary judgment, taking the position that the case should go to the jury. To me, this states a case of disparate burden, and I would let a jury decide whether an employer can force a woman to make this choice.
To me, this states a case of disparate burden, and I would let a jury decide whether an employer can force a woman to make this choice. The requirements must be viewed in the context of the overall policy. While those individual requirements differ according to gender, none on its face places a greater burden on one gender than the other. ¢ ¢ Appearance: Must maintain Personal Best image portrayed at time of hire. It is not because of anatomical differences, such as a requirement that women wear bathing suits that cover their breasts.
. In April 2000, Harrah s amended that policy to require that women wear makeup. The employer insisted that all employees maintain a weight that corresponded to the "desirable" weight for their height as determined by an insurance company table, but women were required to maintain the weight corresponding to women of "medium" build, whereas men were permitted to maintain the weight corresponding to men of "large" build. The Ninth Circuit agreed with Harrah's approach and explained that because "employers are permitted to apply different appearance standards to each sex so long as those standards are equal," the unequal burden test "must sometimes involve weighing the relative burdens particular requirements impose on workers of one sex against the distinct requirements imposed on workers of the other sex. We do note, however, that this is not an exact science yielding results with mathematical certainty. In her deposition testimony, attached as a response to the motion for summary judgment, Jespersen described the personal indignity she felt as a result of attempting to comply with the makeup policy. Grooming standards that appropriately differentiate between the genders are not facially discriminatory.
Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Nev. 2002) :: Justia
MGM Grand Hotel, Inc. Having won the legal battle, I hope that Harrah's will now do the generous and decent thing by offering Jespersen her job back, and letting her give it her personal best-without the makeup. No colored polish is permitted. Title VII does not make exceptions for particular industries, and we should not write them in. § 2000e-2 e ; see also Dothard v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.
It was therefore impermissible for Hopkins's employer to place her in an untenable Catch-22: she needed to be aggressive and masculine to excel at her job, but was denied partnership for doing so because of her employer's gender stereotype. Reed, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted June 22, 2005—San Francisco, California Filed April 14, 2006 Before: Mary M. In Rene, the homosexual plaintiff stated a Title VII sex stereotyping claim because he endured assaults "of a sexual nature" when Rene's co-workers forced him to look at homosexual pornography, gave him sexually-oriented "joke" gifts and harassed him for behavior that did not conform to commonly-accepted male stereotypes. Hair must be worn down at all times, no exceptions. Nor do I think it appropriate for a court to dismiss a woman s testimony that she finds wearing makeup degrading and intrusive, as Jespersen clearly does. Reed, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted June 22, 2005 San Francisco, California Filed April 14, 2006 Before: Mary M.
